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LrnoR LAw-BRBACH OF No-STRIKB CoVENANT-DAMAGE SUITS AGAINST
UmoNs-Plaintiff corporation and defendant union entered into a collective
bargaining agreement which provided that there should be no strikes by members
of the union until the grievance procedure prescribed therein was exhausted.
A wallfout in violation of this agreement occurred and the plaintiff sought damages for the consequent loss of profits. A statute provided that ''Whenever any
unincorporated . . . association . • . shall be formed in this state . • • actions • . •
may be brought by or against such associations.•.•"1 On de novo hearing, held,
the defendant was amenable to suit by virtue of the statute. But in view of the
uncertain profit record of the plaintiff, recovery was allowed only for the amount
of the fixed expenses of the corporation during the time that its operations were
hampered by the strike. General Magnetic Company v. United Electrical Radio
& Machine Workers of Ameri~, Local 937, CIO, 328 Mich. 542, 44 N.W.
(2d) 140 (1950).
In the absence of statute, it has generally been held that a labor organization
has no legal personality and therefore cannot sue or be sued as such.2 This situation has been altered in most states by explicit legislation.3 Other jurisdictions
have adopted statutes of the type involved in the principal case, dealing with "associations" and while some courts have refused to construe these as covering unions,4
the practical effects of such holdings have been minimized in some instances by
legislation specifically allowing suits by and against labor organizations.11
In the remaining jurisdictions,6 legal responsibility may still be imposed upon a
union by virtue of the theory of estoppel7 or the employment of a representative

Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §612.12.
2 TELLER, LAiloR DxsPuTES AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 1362 (1940). But see
Busby v. Electric Utilities Employees Union, (D.C. Cix. 1945) 147 F. (2d) 865.
3 U.S. DEPT. oF LAiloR, LAiloR lNFoRMATION BULLETIN 16 (Maxch, 1947).
. 4 St. Paul Typothetae v. St. Paul Bookbinders' Union, 94 Minn. 351, 102 N.W. 725
(1905); Johnston v. Albritton, 101 Fla. 1285, 134 S. 563 (1931). Contra: Armstrong v.
Superior Ct., 173 Cal. 341, 159 P. 1176 (1916).
5 Fla. Laws (1943) c. 21968, §11; Minn. Laws (1947) c. 527.
6 These states are Ark., Ga., ill., Ky., Me., Mass., Mo., Miss., N.H., Ore., R.I., Tenn.,
and W.Va. [see supra note 3]. To this list must be added Louisiana which has repealed
its "Union Control Act:' [La. Acts (1946) Act No. 180] by La. Acts (1948) Act No. 130.
7 If a union conducts itself as if it were a legal entity it may be estopped from denying
that status when held accountable with respect to such conduct. Forest City Mfg. Co. v.
I.L.G.W.U., 233 Mo. App. 935, Ill S.W. (2d) 934 (1938).
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suit8 Furthermore, under the Taft-Hartley Act9 if a union's activities have
even a slight effect upon interstate commerce, it is amenable to suit in the federal courts for breach of a collective bargaining agreement.10 Nevertheless,
violation of a no-strike covenant11 seldom moves an employer to resort to a damage suit.12 Perhaps one of the reasons for this is the frequent inability to recover
for the loss of profits13 and the consequent probability that the employer will
be limited in his recovery to a substitute, and. often relatively unsatisfactory
measure of damages.14 Moreover, a strike constituting a breach of contract generally relieves the employer of his obligations thereunder15 and imposes upon
him a duty to mitigate his damages. Under some circumstances this might require the employer to hire new employees in defiance of union standards,16 a
course ill-suited to a long-range industrial relations policy.17 A" weightier reason
for the dearth of damage suits against unions for breach of a no-strike covenant
is the availability of more effective courses of action, such as disciplinary layoffs18
and resort to arbitration.19 But no doubt the primary reason why damage suits
8 Smith v. Ar~sas Motor Freight Lines, 214 Ark. 553, 217 S.W. (2d) 249 (1949);
Mursener v. Forte, 186 Ore. 253, 205 P. (2d) 568 (1949).
9 Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 Stat. L. 136, §301 (a), (b) (1947), 29
U.S.C. (1950 Supp.) §185 (a), (b).
10 Shirley-Herman Co. v. International Hod Carriers, Bldg. & Common Laborers
Union of America, Local No. 210, (2d Cir. 1950) 182 F. (2d) 806. See also International
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 501 v. NLRB, (2d Cir. 1950) 181 F. (2d) 34.
11 A no-strike covenant must be 5Pecifically set out in the collective bargaining agreement and will not be implied, merely, from provisions therein establishing grievance machinery. Dorsey Trailers, Inc., 80 N.L.R.B. Rep. 489 (1948).
12 Report of the Joint Committee on Labor-Management Relations, 80th Cong., 2d
sess., Rep. 986, Part 3, pp. 30-32 (1948). See also BURBAU OF NATIONAL APFAms, THB
TAFT-HARTLEY Ac:r APTER ONE YEAR 185-186 (1948).
13 Unless a business enterprise is well established and has evidenced a consistent profit
record, recovery for loss of profits is too remote and 5Peculative to be allowed. See, in addition to the principal case, Baker v. Lloyd, 198 Okla. 512, 179 P. (2d) 913 (1947). But
see Schumann v. Karrer, 184 Cal. 50, 192 P. 849 (1920).
14 WILLISTON, CoNTRACTS §1345 (1937). But the substitute measure is generally the
interest on the value of the property, or the rental value of the property, kept idle by the
breach. 1 CoNTRAc:rs REsTA'l'EMENT §331 (1932). The principal case is unique in that
it adopts the fixed costs of the strike-impeded business as a substitute measure of damages.
111 NLRB v. Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U.S. 332, 59 S.Ct. 508 (1939); The Timken Roller
Bearing Co. v. NLRB, (6th Cir. 1947) 161 F. (2d) 949.
16 In the case of breach of an ordinary employment contract by employees, it is gen•
erally assumed that the employer is in a position to mitigate his damages by hiring new
personnel. See WILLISTON, CoNTRACTS §1362 (1937).
17 The writer was unable to find any cases bearing directly on the question of whether
the courts will apply the ordinary rules of contract law to a collective bargaining agreement
so far as requiring an employer to engage in "strike-breaking" in order to mitigate damages.
Apparently union attorneys are reluctant to raise this issue, though they may be expected
to do so where the damages claimed are very large. However one eminent authority has
observed that "judges • • • have often been unable to SPlit their judicial personality sufficiently to deal with the turbulent clash of values found in labor matters." TELLER, A
LAlloR PoLICY FOR AMERICA 25 (1945). But see Boeing AirPlane Co. v. Aeronautical
Industrial Dist. Lodge No. 751, of JAM, (D.C. Wash. 1950) 91 F. Supp. 596 at 606-607.
1s BURBAu OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, CoLLEcnvE BARGAINING CoNTRAc:rs 236 and 526
(1941). But see note, 49 MICH, L. REv. 142 (1950).
10 UNITJID STATES DEPT. oF LAlloR, 68 MONTHLY LAB. REv. 145 (1949). See also
GREGORY, LAlloR AND nm LAw 409 (1946).
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are infrequently pressed is that the court "victory" of today may well mean the
labor relations debacle of tomorrow; parties who must continue to live together
can assure little but mutual hostility if they must litigate their differences. Nevertheless, the trend towards increasing the legal responsibility of labor organizations has affected industrial relations by affording a bargaining point for employers20 by which they have been able to win cqncessions from unions not
otherwise likely to have been obtained.21

Bernard L. Goodman, S. Ed.

20 The legislative history of the Taft-Hartley Act (supra note 9) indicates that Congress
expected the abrogation of union liability under §301 to be a bargaining point. S. Rep. No.
105, 80th Cong., 1st sess., p. 18 (1947). It now appears as though this expectation has
been realized. See U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, 68 MoNTHLY LAB. REv. 145 (1949).
21 Zorn, "New Union Responsibility," NEw Yonx UNIVERSITY, FmsT Amru-AL CoNFERl!NCE ON LABoR 318 (1948).

